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The Fate of Arbitration Agreements after 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
By Librado Arreola

I. Introduction
In the past, the U.S. courts
considered arbitration clauses within
individual employment contracts
and collective bargaining agreements that purported to obligate
employees to arbitrate claims
based on employment statutes
differently. When an individual employment contract contained an
arbitration provision, the courts
would enforce it and require the
parties to arbitrate their dispute.1
When a collective bargaining agreement required arbitration of statutory claims, the courts would not
enforce that provision.2 However,
since 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,3
the Supreme Court no longer
distinguishes between arbitration
provisions contained within individual employment contracts and
within collective bargaining agreements, (CBA) and will enforce the
CBA provision by requiring the
parties to arbitrate their dispute.4
The question before the Court in
14 Penn Plaza was whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that required union members
to arbitrate claims arising under the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)5 was enforceable.6 The
provision at issue stated:
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§30 NO DISCRIMINATION.
There shall be no discrimination
against any present or future
employee by reason of race,
creed, color, age, disability,
national origin, sex, union
membership, or any other
characteristic protected by law,
including, but not limited to,
claims made pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York
State Human Rights Law, the
New York City Human Rights
Code, . . . or any other similar
laws, rules, or regulations. All
such claims shall be subject to
the grievance and arbitration
procedures (Article V and VI) as
the sole and exclusive remedy
for violations. Arbitrators shall
apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon
claims of discrimination.7
The grievants worked for Temco
Service Industries, Inc. (Temco), as
night lobby watchmen until August
2003, when the building owner, 14
Penn Plaza, engaged the services of
a unionized security contractor
who was affiliated with Temco, to
provide licensed security guards to
staff the lobby and entrances of the
building.8 The building contracted
with the security contractor with
the union's consent.9 As a result,
Temco reassigned the grievants to
jobs as night porters and light duty
cleaners in other locations in the
building.10
At the grievants' request, the
union filed a grievance, challenging
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the reassignments.11 The grievants
contended that they had lost
income and their new positions
were less desirable than their
former positions.12 The grievance
alleged that the building owner
violated the collective bargaining
agreement's ban on workplace
discrimination by reassigning the
grievants on account of their age,
violated seniority rules by failing to
promote one of the grievants to
another position, and failed to
equitably rotate overtime.13
The grievance was advanced to
arbitration.14 After the commencement of the arbitration hearing, the
union withdrew the discrimination
allegation and continued to arbitrate the two remaining allegations.15 The union believed that
because it had consented to the
building owner contracting the
work to licensed security guards, it
could not legitimately object to the
reassignment of the grievants as
discriminatory.16
While the arbitration was progressing, the grievants filed a
charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
alleging that the building owner had
discriminated against them in
violation of the ADEA.17 The EEOC
issued a right to sue letter and the
grievants filed suit in U.S. District
Court against the building owner
for violating the ADEA. They also
sued the union alleging a breach of
the union's "duty of fair representation" under the National Labor
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Relations Act (NLRA),18 premised
on the union's withdrawal of the age
discrimination claims during the
arbitration.19 The suit against the
union was later voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.20
The District Court denied the
building owner's motion to compel
arbitration of the ADEA claims.
Following an interlocutory appeal
by the building owner, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court
because Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. held "that a collective
bargaining agreement could not
waive a covered workers' right to a
judicial forum for causes of action
created by Congress."21 The Court
of Appeals noted that GardnerDenver conflicted with the Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
holding that "an individual employee who had agreed individually
to waive his right to a federal forum
could be compelled to arbitrate a
federal age discrimination claim."22
To reconcile the two decisions, the
Court of Appeals held "that
arbitration provisions in a collective
bargaining agreement purporting
to waive an employee's right to a
federal forum with respect to
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statutory claims were unenforceable."23 The Supreme Court noted
that the result of the Court of
Appeals' decision was that "an
individual employee would be free
to choose compulsory arbitration
under Gilmer, but a labor union
could not collectively bargain for
arbitration" of individual statutory
rights on behalf of its members.24
On review, the Supreme Court
observed that the contractual
provision at issue was freely
negotiated in good faith between
the union and the building owner
and qualified as a condition of
employment. Accordingly, it was a
mandatory subject of bargaining
under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).25 The Court disagreed
with the employees' assertion that
the arbitration clause was outside
the permissible scope of the
collective bargaining process because it affected the "employees'
individual non-economic statutory
rights."26 Instead, the Court noted
that the arbitration provision must
be honored because Congress did
not exempt the ADEA from the
provisions of the NLRA, which
grants unions the authority to
collectively bargain for arbitration
of workplace discrimination claims.27
In this instance, the Court deferred
to Congressional intent.28
The Court compared collectively
bargained arbitration provisions
with arbitration agreements contained in individual employment
contracts. 29 The Court stated,
"Nothing in the law suggests a
distinction between the status of
arbitration agreements signed by
an individual employee and those
agreed to by a union representative."30 In doing so, the Court
ignored that individuals with employment contracts have negotiated the contracts on their own
behalf and the contracts benefit
only them. On the other hand, a
union, as the collective bargaining
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representative of the employees,
bargains with the employer on
behalf of all the employees it
represents; the union is only
required to bargain over "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment" of its members.31 Different members always
have different needs and wants, and
sometimes those needs and wants
conflict. However, in the end, the
benefits a union successfully bargains on behalf of a majority of its
members apply to all members of
the bargaining unit.
The differences between individual employment contracts and
collective bargaining agreements
are significant. Individual employees who may not like the terms of
their proposed employment contract may walk away rather than
negotiate with the prospective
employer. A union, on the other
hand, must always bargain in good
faith with the employer either until
a contract is agreed upon or until
the employer declares an impasse
in the negotiations, at which point
the employer may impose the terms
of its final offer upon the unionized
employees. Because the ADEA
protects only those employees who
are at least age forty, younger
members may not care if they
bargain away their ADEA rights;
however members within the protected class may not want to
negotiate those rights away.
Individual employees subject to
agreements obligating them to
arbitrate statutory claims who
believe that they have been discriminated against are free to
utilize the arbitration procedure to
challenge the perceived wrong.
Union-represented employees who
believe that they have been discriminated against may not initiate
arbitration procedures on their
own; they must file a grievance with
the union and the union decides
whether to proceed to arbitration.
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It is these differences in procedure
and conflicts of interest that
distinguish an arbitration provision
in the collective bargaining context
from an arbitration provision contained within an individual employment contract. In the latter case,
the individual knowingly and voluntarily waives his or her rights to
proceed in court, but more importantly, the individual may initiate
arbitration when he or she chooses
to do so.
In Gardner-Denver, the Court
stated that the rights conferred
upon an individual by Title VII "can
form no part of the collective
bargaining process since waiver of
these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII."32 Despite this, in
14 Penn Plaza, the Court maintained that its holding did not
contradict the holding of GardnerDenver, because the arbitration
provision at issue in 14 Penn Plaza
expressly covered both statutory
and contractual discrimination
claims.33 The Court not only ignored
established precedent, it stated
that the Court in Gardner-Denver
confused an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims with a prospective
waiver of the substantive right. The
14 Penn Plaza Court then distinguished Gardner-Denver, stating,
"The decision to resolve ADEA
claims by way of arbitration instead
of litigation does not waive the
statutory right to be free from
workplace age discrimination; it
waives only the right to seek relief
from a court in the first instance."34
The Court did not overrule GardnerDenver, but it substantially limited
its holding.
In support of its decision, the
Court relied on Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.,35 which overruled Wilko v.
Swan,36 a 1953 decision that held
that an agreement to arbitrate
claims under the Securities Act of
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1933 was unenforceable. Rodriguez
de Quijas characterized the 1953
decision as pervaded by "the old
judicial hostility to arbitration."37
The 14 Penn Plaza Court stated
that in light of the radical changes
over two decades in the Court's
receptivity to arbitration, "reliance
on any judicial decision similarly
littered with Wilko's overt hostility
to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements would be ill advised."38
The 14 Penn Plaza Court then
recited some of the "mistakes" of
the Gardner-Denver case, such as
questioning the competence of
arbitrators to decide federal statutory claims and believing that while
arbitration was well suited to the
resolution of contractual disputes,
it was an inappropriate forum for
the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII. The 14 Penn
Plaza Court concluded that these
misconceptions about arbitration
have been corrected and quoted the
Gilmer decision, which stated that
it is unlikely that age discrimination
claims require more extensive
discovery than other claims that
have been found by the courts to be
arbitrable, such as RICO and
antitrust claims.39
Finally, the Court considered the
conflict between a union's interests
and those of
the individual
employees, a factor which courts
had previously weighed heavily
when they faced this sort of case. In
Gardner-Denver, the Court was
concerned with the union's exclusive control over the manner and
extent to which an individual
grievance is presented. 40 The
Gardner-Denver Court added that
in arbitration, as in the collective
bargaining process, a union may
subordinate the interests of an
individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit.41 The 14 Penn Plaza
Court considered this conflict of
interest argument to be "too much,"
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reasoning that it could not rely on
judicial policy concerns as a source
of authority for introducing a
qualification into the ADEA that is
not found in the statute's text.42
Instead, the Court suggested that it
is up to Congress to amend the
ADEA to address this alleged
conflict of interest.
The Court also posited an answer
to the conflict of interest dilemma.
The Court stated that the principle
of majority rule that organized
labor is governed by does not justify
singling out an arbitration provision
for "disfavored treatment."43 The
Court added that Congress accounted for this conflict of interest
by imposing a "duty of fair
representation" on unions, which a
union breaches when its conduct
toward a member of the bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith. Thus, the Court's
answer was to hold a union liable if it
breaches its duty of fair representation. The Court further added that
union members may also file age
discrimination claims with the
EEOC which may then seek judicial
intervention.44
However, the Court ignored the
nature of the duty of fair representation. That duty is a judicially
developed doctrine; there is no
explicit statutory requirement
adopted by Congress. The duty of
fair representation doctrine arose
under the Railway Labor Act as a
result of race-based discrimination
by unions.45 Like the Railway Labor
Act, the National Labor Relations
Act has no explicit statutory
language creating a duty of fair
representation.46 The duty of fair
representation doctrine evolved as
a result of the "exclusive representative" provisions of Section 9(a) of
the NLRA and Section 2, ninth of
the RLA, which confer upon labor
unions their exclusive representative status over all employees in a
bargaining unit.
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The 14 Penn Plaza Court failed to
properly consider the exclusive
representative status of the union.
Here, the union had consented to
the building owner's subcontracting
of the work which led to the building
owner reassigning the grievants to
different jobs. Because the union
had consented to the subcontracting, it decided not to pursue the
affected employees' ADEA claims in
arbitration. As a result, the affected
employees brought suit against the
building owner and the union.
Perhaps the Court believed that the
conflict of interest ceased to exist
when the affected employees voluntarily dismissed their suit against
the union. Instead of addressing the
issue head-on, the Court reiterated
that, "Given this avenue that
Congress made available to redress
a union's violation of its duty to its
members, it is particularly inappropriate to ask this Court to impose
an artificial limitation on the
collective bargaining process."47
Thus, the Court in 14 Penn Plaza
no longer considers whether the
right at issue is an individual
contractual right or a collective
right. The Court will, in the first
instance, look only at the language
of the arbitration provision; if it
clearly and unmistakably requires
union members to arbitrate ADEA
or other statutory claims, then the
courts must enforce the provision
and send the issue to an arbitrator.
In essence, the Court now
advocates for suits against unions.
The Court leaves employees with
only the alternative of seeking to
hold their union liable for violating
the ADEA and/or its duty to
represent all of its members fairly
when it chooses to resolve a conflict
of interest between an individual's
rights and the rights of the majority
of the bargaining unit by not
pursuing an individual's grievance
to arbitration.
Will the Court's discussion of the
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duty of fair representation encourage more lawsuits against unions?
Will the Court's discussion of the
duty of fair representation alter the
way the lower courts analyze such
suits and relax the standards that
the courts presently utilize? It is
uncertain whether more lawsuits
will be filed against unions. However, the Court's opinion does not
relax the standards used to
evaluate duty of fair representation
claims and should not lead to a
change in the way such cases are
handled by the courts.
Discussed below are several
cases that were decided immediately after 14 Penn Plaza. These
cases provide a glimpse into how
the lower courts are treating cases
involving anti-discrimination provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
There have not been many recent
cases dealing with a union's breach
of its duty of fair representation in a
context similar to 14 Penn Plaza.
The most notable is Hollman v.
Teamster Local 682,48 where the
court construed a pro se plaintiff's
complaint against her union as a
claim for a breach of the duty of fair
representation. Plaintiff claimed
that the union's failure to arbitrate
her claims for retaliation and sex
discrimination was itself discriminatory. The court quoted 14 Penn
Plaza for the proposition that a
union "enjoys broad authority . . . in
the negotiation and administration
of the collective bargaining contract,"49 but breaches its duty of
fair representation "if it illegally
discriminates against one of its
members."50 The court found that
the union did not breach its duty of
fair representation because the
union had pursued a grievance
regarding plaintiff's discharge and
participated in that grievance in
good faith. The Union also acted in
good faith by declining to pursue
the grievance further because there
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was a lack of credible evidence in
plaintiff's favor. Thus, the court
granted the union's motion for
summary judgment.
Another case dealing with a
union's breach of the "duty of fair
representation" since 14 Penn
Plaza is Perez v. New York's Health
& Human Services Union 1199/
SEIU.51 Perez was terminated by
her employer, Montefiore Medical
Center, on July 21, 2005. The union
filed a grievance and an arbitration
hearing commenced on April 11,
2006 and continued for several
days. On September 19, 2006, the
arbitrator upheld the discharge.
On August 15, 2008, Perez filed the
lawsuit against the union for a
breach of the duty of fair representation. Although the court quoted
14 Penn Plaza for the proposition
that a union is subject to the duty of
fair representation, it granted the
union's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Perez's
complaint was untimely.
The most recent case dealing
with a union's breach of the duty of
fair representation after 14 Penn
Plaza is Trezza v. United Workers
of America.52 Trezza was injured
on-the-job on or about June 6, 2002.
He received 26 weeks of short-term
disability sick pay. On April 8, 2005,
he was terminated by his employer
because he did not return to work
for full duty. The union filed a
grievance challenging his discharge.
Trezza pursued a separate workers
compensation claim against his
employer. On January 17, 2006,
Trezza also field an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB
against the union alleging a failure
to process his termination grievance. The NLRB dismissed the
charge on March 23, 2006. Trezza
appealed the NLRB dismissal and
asserted that the union had failed
to represent him properly and that
he planned to file a lawsuit against
the union. Trezza then filed a
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charge on January 25, 2006, with
the EEOC against his employer and
the union asserting that he was
discriminated against because of
his disability. That charge was
settled between Trezza and the
union on June 14, 2006, with the
union agreeing to represent Trezza
in an arbitration if he prevailed in
his workers compensation action;
however if he did not prevail, then
the union agreed to review whether
there was merit to proceeding with
the arbitration. The union also
agreed to coordinate with Trezza's
workers compensation lawyer.
Trezza then filed suit against his
employer on November 1, 2006, and
sued the union in state court on
October 23, 2006, which suit was
removed to federal court. The suit
against the union alleged a breach
of the union's duty of fair representation. As in the Perez case, the
court quoted 14 Penn Plaza for the
proposition that the union could be
liable for a breach of its duty of fair
representation, but granted the
union's motion for summary judgment because Trezza's complaint
was untimely.
There have been a handful of
other cases decided by the federal
district courts since April 1, 2009,
when the 14 Penn Plaza decision
issued. Most notable is the case of
Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc.,53
which involved the same contract
language as was before the Court in
14 Penn Plaza.
Plaintiff, a 62 year-old immigrant
from the Slovak Republic who had
worked for 25 years as a daytime
office cleaner, sued her employer
for discrimination based on her
disability and national origin and
for retaliation. The court denied
the employer's motion to compel
arbitration on the ground that the
union had prevented the plaintiff
from arbitrating her claims. The
court noted that the plaintiff had
signed a sworn declaration stating
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that her union declined to prosecute her claims for disability
discrimination and that her union
representative had laughed when
she asked to have the grievance
arbitrated. The court stated that
under these circumstances the
collective bargaining agreement
had precluded the plaintiff from
raising her disability discrimination
claims in any forum and would thus
operate as a waiver over plaintiff's
substantive rights, which could not
be enforced.
In Shipkevich v. Staten Island
University Hospital,54 the plaintiff
brought a claim under Title VII for
discrimination based on his status
as a "Russian-American Jew born in
Moldova." The district court denied
the employer's motion to dismiss.
The court found that the collective
bargaining agreement did not
mandate arbitration of the plaintiff's
claims because it did not clearly and
unmistakably require arbitration of
statutory
anti-discrimination
claims. The anti-discrimination provision in the collective bargaining
agreement read, "Neither the
Employer nor the Union shall
discriminate against or in favor of
any Employee on account of race,
color, creed, national origin, political belief, sex, sexual orientation,
citizenship status, marital status,
disability or age."55 In finding there
was no clear and unmistakable
waiver of the plaintiff's statutory
claims, the court distinguished 14
Penn Plaza because the contract in
that case mentioned a discrimination statute by name, whereas the
contract before the court, as in the
Gardner-Denver case, did not
mention discrimination statutes by
name.
In Borrero v. Ruppert Housing
Co.,56 a pro se plaintiff brought a
claim for discrimination based on
"national origin and disability,"
which the court construed as claims
arising under Title VII and the
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ADA.57 The court granted the
employer's motion to dismiss where
it found the language of the
collective bargaining agreement
clearly and unmistakably required
the Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims;
14 Penn Plaza controlled.58
The collective bargaining agreement prohibited "discrimination
against any present or future
employee by reason of race, [etc.] . . .
or any characteristic protected by
law, including but not limited to
claims made pursuant to Title VII . . .
[and] the Americans with Disabilities Act."59 It also provided that
"all such claims shall be subject to
the grievance and arbitration procedure . . . as sole and exclusive
remedy for violations."60 However,
the court noted that it was
dismissing the claims without
prejudice because if the plaintiff
was prevented by the union from
arbitrating his claims, the
agreement's arbitration provision
would not be enforceable.61
In Mathews v. Denver Newspaper
Agency LLP,62 the plaintiff, a person of South Indian descent and a
member of Denver Mailers Union
No. 8, brought claims for discriminatory demotion and retaliation
under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §
1981.63 The case was brought after
plaintiff had already received an
unfavorable ruling from an arbitrator on both his contractual and Title
VII claims.64 The anti-discrimination provision in the collective
bargaining agreement read, "The
Employer and the Union acknowledge continuation of their policies
of no discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis
of age, sex, race, religious beliefs,
color, national origin or disability in
accordance with and as required by
applicable state and federal law."65
The court held that the plaintiff's
claims could not be considered in a
judicial forum because he had
already voluntary pursued arbitra-
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tion under the collective bargaing
agreement. 66
St. Aubin v. Unilever HPCNA67
dealt with a claim involving the
Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).
Plaintiff, a production
machine adjuster at a soap manufacturing plant and a union member, was terminated by the company.68 Plaintiff filed a grievance
alleging that he was terminated
without just cause in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement.69
The arbitrator found that the
company had just cause to terminate the plaintiff.70 Plaintiff filed
suit alleging retaliatory discharge
under the FMLA and requested
that the court vacate the adverse
arbitration award pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act.71 Ruling
on Unilever's motion to dismiss, the
court found that plaintiff's claim
under the Federal Arbitration Act
was barred by the statute of
limitations.72 However, the court
held that the prior arbitration
award did not preclude plaintiff's
FMLA claim because plaintiff's
collective bargaining agreement did
not contain a "clear and unmistakable" requirement to arbitrate
employment discrimination claims
as described in 14 Penn Plaza.73 In
its preamble, the contract stated
that the parties agreed to comply
with all employment laws including
the FMLA, but the court noted that
the arbitration and anti-discrimination clauses were distinct, as the
arbitration clause did not refer to
the anti-discrimination provision.74
In Catrino v. Town of Ocean
City,75 the plaintiff, a diabetic
police officer and member of Ocean
City Lodge No. 10, Fraternal Order
of Police, brought a claim for
constructive discharge under the
ADA after he left his post to go
home to attend to his medical
condition.76 Defendant took the
position that plaintiff had voluntarily resigned and refused to allow
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him to return to work.77 The union
filed a grievance challenging the
termination, which was arbitrated
and denied by the arbitrator.78 The
arbitrator found that plaintiff had
voluntarily terminated his own
employment by leaving his post and
allegedly made a statement to the
effect of, "I quit."79 The collective
bargaining agreement stated, "The
provisions of this Agreement shall
be applied equally to all employees . . .
without discrimination as to age,
sex, marital status, race, creed,
color national origin, political
affiliation, disability as defined in
the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), or sexual orientation."80
Ruling on defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court held that the
collective bargaining agreement did
not require the plaintiff to submit
his ADA claim to binding arbitration
because the agreement only concerned arbitration of contractual
discrimination claims.81 The court
stated that the reference to the
ADA was only included in the
collective bargaining agreement for
the purpose of providing a shorthand means of defining the term
"disability."82 Ultimately, the court
held that the arbitration did not
preclude litigation of the plaintiff's
statutory discrimination claims,
but nonetheless dismissed the case
because plaintiff did not properly
state a claim for constructive
discharge.83 On October 14, 2009
the court re-opened the case by
granting plaintiff's motion to amend
judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procdure 59(e) and denied
defendant's motion to dismiss.84
Specifically, the court held that its
prior ruling was clear error because
plaintiff had properly stated a claim
for wrongful discharge under the
ADA.85 The court vacated its prior
order and permitted this case to go
forward.86
In Markell v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan,87 the plaintiff filed suit

6

against her employer alleging a
violation of the ADEA following her
discharge for violating the
employer's confidentiality policy
when she took copies of patient files
home. The union grieved and
proceeded to arbitration. The issue
presented to the arbitrator was
whether plaintiff had been discharged for "just cause" and the
issue of possible age discrimination
was not raised. The arbitrator
sustained plaintiff's discharge. The
federal district court had previously denied the employer's motion
for summary judgment requesting
deferral to the arbitration decision
and ruled that plaintiff could
proceed with her lawsuit. The
Supreme Court then issued 14 Penn
Plaza while this suit was in process
and defendant employer requested
reconsideration; the court allowed
additional briefing on the issue.
The collective bargaining agreement contained the following antidiscrimination provision:
The Employer and the Union
agree that each will fully comply
with applicable laws and regulations regarding discrimination
and will not discriminate against
any Employee because of such
person's race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, gender, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, veteran
status, sexual orientation, or
the membership in and/or
activity on behalf of the Union. 88
The contract created a formal
grievance resolution procedure to
address disputes regarding the
interpretation and/or the application of the agreement. In the event
such disputes were not resolved,
the parties were free to arbitrate
and the arbitrator's decision would
be final and binding. The court
found that the collective bargaining
agreement did not require the
arbitration of plaintiff's statutory
claims. The court added that where
a contract authorizes arbitration of
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contract-based claims only, the
preclusive effect of an arbitral
decision on subsequent litigation of
federal statutory claims remains
governed by Gardner-Denver and
its progeny. The court found that
there was no clear and unmistakable waiver of a federal judicial
forum for resolution of disputes
regarding statutory rights and
upheld its prior decision.

II. Conclusion
It is too early to tell from just a
handfull of cases whether 14 Penn
Plaza will result in increased
litigation against unions alleging a
breach of a union's duty of fair
representation. However, courts
seem to be reluctant to find that the
existence of general anti-discrimination language in a collective
bargaining agreement is sufficient
to waive a plaintiff's right to have
their statutory claims heard in
‚
court.
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49. Id. at *5.
50. Id.
51. No. 08 CV 7940, 2009 WL 2611940
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009).
52. No. 08 CV 9801, 2010 WL 1253533
(S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2010).
53.186 LRRM 2565 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
54. No. 08-CV-1008, 2009 WL 1706590
(E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009).
55. Id. at *1.
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57. Id. at *1.
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64. Id.
65. Id. at *5.
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71. Id.
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75. No. WMN -09-505, 2009 WL 2151205 (D.
Md. July 14, 2009).
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *4-6.
84. Catrino v. Town of Ocean City, No.
WMN-09-505, 2009 WL 3347356, at *1 (D.
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85. Id. at *2.
86. Id.
87. No. CV 08-752 , 2009 WL 3334897
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‚
88. Id. at *2.

Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public
Employee Relations Report. It
highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community.
This issue focuses on developments
under the collective bargaining
statutes and the Fourth Amendment.

IELRA Developments
Arbitrability
In Cobden Education Association,
IEA-NEA v. Cobden School Unit
District No. 17, No. 2008-CA-0023-S
(IELRB 2010), the IELRB, in a 3-2
decision, held that Cobden School
Unit District No. 17 violated section
14(a)(1) of the IELRA by refusing to
arbitrate several grievances with
Spencer Cox, a third year nontenured teacher. The District was
ordered to arbitrate grievances
regarding Cox's evaluations and
personnel files, because these
issues expressly involved the terms
of the collective bargaining agree-
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ment, and did not conflict with any
Illinois statute. The IELRB further
held that the District did not violate
Section 14(a)(1) by refusing to
arbitrate Cox’s grievance regarding
whether he was dismissed for just
cause because the issue was not
arbitrable due to a conflict with
Section 10-22.4 of the School Code,
which states that school districts
have the power to dismiss teachers
“whenever, in is opinion, the
interests of the schools requre it.”
On April 16, 2007, the Association
filed a grievance on behalf of Cox,
claiming that the District violated
Articles VI, VII, and XIII of the
collective bargaining agreement by
failing to follow the Evaluation Plan,
failing to maintain a personnel file
for Cox, relying on information
outside Cox’s personnel file in not
renewing him and displining him
without just cause.
The grievance was denied at each
level of the grievance procedure.
The Association then filed a
demand for arbitration, but the
District cancelled the arbitration
hearing and refused to process the
grievance to arbitration.
The IELRB first considered
whether Cox's claim, that Article
XIII implied that the District was
contractually required to use the
agreed-upon evaluation plan, was
arbitrable. Article XIII provided, in
pertinent part, "[a] staff evaluation
committee . . . shall be established
to review the staff evaluation plan.
Any recommendations for changes
in said plan shall be submitted to
the Superintendent for review and
consideration by the Board of
Education." The evaluation plan
required non-tenured teachers to
be observed and evaluated. The
evaluation plan also required the
principal to write a report "describing the outcome of the evaluation
and providing specific recommendations for improvements when-
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ever appropriate."
The evaluation plan provided:
A teacher will be placed upon
remediation status under the
following conditions:
A. The evaluator determines,
as a result of performance
observations, that identified
weaknesses are significant
enough to rate the teacher's
overall performance as "unsatisfactory".
B. The weaknesses are remediable.
A written remediation plan was
required for teachers under
remediation
status.
The
remediation plan was required to
contain a description of the
condition(s) in need of change.
Teachers who completed the
remediation plan were to be
reinstated. Teachers who did not
complete the remediation plan with
a satisfactory or better rating were
to be dismissed.
The District argued that, under
Niles Township High School District 219 v. IELRB, 379 Ill.App.3d
22, 883 N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist. 2007),
the claim was not arbitrable. In
Niles Township, the court determined that grievances concerning
violations of provisions in a CBA
concerning evaluations and personnel files were not arbitrable.
However, the IELRB distinguished
Niles Township, stating:
In Niles Township, the grievances claimed that, because the
reason for the non-renewal of
certain non-tenured teachers
was not apparent in or supported by the evaluations, the
employer had to make the case
that evaluation is meaningless.
The Association [made no] such
claim in this case. In contrast to
[the] claim in Niles Township,
the Association's claims in this
case are tied to specific language in the evaluation plan and
the collective bargaining agreement.
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The IELRB further asserted that
the CBA in Niles Township "did not
contain any requirement that nontenured teachers be evaluated; that
a teacher be placed on remediation
status; or that a teacher who did not
complete the remediation plan with
a satisfactory or better rating, as
opposed to one who did, be
dismissed." The CBA in Niles
Township merely stated what
procedures should be followed if an
evaluation was made, whereas the
evaluation plan here contained such
requirements. The IELRB concluded that the merits of Cox's
grievance regarding evaluation plans
were for the arbitrator to decide.
The dissenting IELRB members
argued that the evaluation plan in
this case did not require that nontenured teachers be evaluated or
placed on remediation as a prerequisite for dismissal. The dissenters
further argued that the evaluation
plan in this case did not require that
a teacher's possibly remediable
weaknesses be documented or that
a remediation plan be established
before dismissal.
However, the
majority stated, that "the provisions in the evaluation plan in this
case were inextricably linked to a
teacher's dismissal." Further, the
evaluation plan stated that teachers failing to complete the
remediation plan with a satisfactory or better rating were to be
dismissed; thus, the procedures
leading up to that point were also
"inextricably linked" to a teacher's
dismissal.
Second, the IELRB analyzed
whether there was a contractual
agreement to arbitrate Cox's claim
that the District violated Article
VII of the CBA because his
personnel file did not contain
evidence that would support his
non-renewal.
Article VII of the
CBA provided, in pertinent part,
that "[o]nly one official file shall be
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maintained" and that "[a]ny materials not contained in the employee's
personnel file, may not be used to
evaluate or discipline the employee
in any manner."
The District argued that, under
Niles Township, the claims were
not arbitrable. In Niles Township,
the grievances stated that the
employer violated the personnel
file provision in the CBA because
the personnel file did not contain
any material indicating poor conduct or service by the teachers, and
the employer must have been
keeping or accessing another file.
The court stated that the CBA did
not require the employer to place
material in the official personnel
file explaining its decision to
dismiss a non-tenured teacher, and
that the union's claim that the
employer was accessing another file
was "mere conjecture."
However, here the CBA stated,
"[A]ny materials not contained in
the employee's personnel file, may
not be used to evaluate or discipline
the employee in any manner."
Further, the Association stated
that it was prepared to present
evidence that the decision to nonrenew Cox was based upon an
undisclosed rationale that did not
appear in Cox's personnel file.
Therefore, the Association's claim
that material not contained in Cox's
personnel file was used to discipline
Cox was not "mere conjecture." As
such, Niles Township did not
control.
Additionally, the District cited
Lockport Area Special Education
Cooperative v. Lockport Area Special Education Cooperative Association, 33 Ill.App.3d 789, 794, 338
N.E.2d 463, 467 (3d Dist. 1975),
which states that the School Code
"suggests that the dismissal of a
probationary teacher is not the type
of punishment envisioned by the
use of the word 'discipline' in the
collective bargaining agreement."
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However, the IELRB stated that
"this goes to the merits of the
grievance . . . which . . . are a matter
for the arbitrator to decide."
The IELRB concluded that there
was a contractual agreement to
arbitrate the portion of Cox's
grievance regarding his personnel
file.
Finally, the IELRB considered
whether the District's non-renewal
of Cox violated Article 6.2 of the
CBA, which provided that discipline
must be for "just cause." The CBA
contained no limitation on the right
of non-tenured teachers to challenge their non-renewals. The
IELRB concluded that the District
had a contractual agreement to
arbitrate because Cox's claim that
he was "non-renewed without just
cause" expressly involved the terms
of the CBA, as outlined in Article
6.2.
The IELRB then considered
whether IELRA § 10(b) prohibited
the arbitration of Cox's grievance.
Section 10(b) provides that "[t]he
parties to the collective bargaining
process shall not effect or implement a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement if the implementation of that provision would
be in violation of, or inconsistent
with, or in conflict with any statute
or statutes enacted by the General
Assembly of Illinois. . . ." The Illinois
Supreme Court decided that, under
Section 10(b), where a provision in a
CBA violates, is inconsistent with or
conflicts with any Illinois statute,
an arbitration award implementing
that award is not binding and
cannot be enforced.
The IELRB held that Section
10(b) did not prohibit the arbitration of the portions of Cox's
grievance regarding evaluations
and personnel file provisions, as
there are no statutes with which
arbitration of those topics would
conflict.
However, the IELRB unani-
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mously held that the portion of
Cox's grievance claiming that there
was no just cause for his nonrenewal was prohibited under
Section 10(b), as interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Board of
Education of Rockford School
District No. 205 v. IELRB, 165 Ill.2d
80, 649 N.E.2d 369 (1995), because
Section 10-22.4 of the School Code
provides, that a school board has
the power to dismiss a teacher
"whenever, in its opinion, the
interests of the schools require it."
Relying on Granite City Community Unit School District #9 v.
IELRB, 279 Ill.App.3d 439, 664
N.E.2d 1060 (4th Dist. 1996), the
IELRB stated that a grievance may
be inarbitrable because an
arbitrator's review of an employer's
decision is "in violation or, or
inconsistent with, or in conflict
with" a specific statutory provision,
as well as an integral part of a
statutory scheme.
The IELRB concluded that the
portion of Cox's grievance concerning whether he was non-renewed
without just cause was not arbitrable under Section 10(b) of the
IELRA.

IPLRA Developments
Mangerial Employees
In AFSCME, Council 31 v. State of
Illinois, Department of Central
Management Services (Illinois Commerce Commission), Case No. S-RC
-10-046 (ILRB, State Panel 2010)
the State Panel held that employees of the Illinois Commerce
Commission (ICC) in the title of
Administrative Law Judge V (ALJV) are not managerial employees
under the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act.
The ICC argued that the ALJ-Vs
were managerial employees pursuant to the test traditionally applied
to that term or under the
alternative "managerial as a matter
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of law" test. Under the traditional
test, a "managerial employee" is
"an individual who is engaged
predominantly in executive and
management functions and is
charged with the responsibility of
directing the effectuation of management policies and practices." To
determine if an employee meets
this definition, the Board applies a
two-part analysis: (1) the employee
must be engaged predominantly in
executive and management functions; and (2) the employee must be
charged with directing the effectuation of management policies and
procedures.
Executive and management
functions "relate to the running a
department and include such activities as formulating department
policy, preparing the budget, and
assuring the efficient and effective
operation of the department. Other
examples of executive and management functions include "using
independent discretion to make
policy decisions as opposed to
following established policy, changing the focus of an employer's
organization, being responsible for
day-to-day operations, negotiating
on behalf of an employer with its
employees or the public, and
exercising authority to pledge an
employer's credit."
The State Panel held that an
employee does not "direct the
effectuation of management policies and procedures if he merely
performs duties essential to the
employer's ability to accomplish its
missions." Rather he "must possess
the authority or responsibility to
determine the specific methods or
means of how the employer's
services will be provided."
The ICC argued that the quasijudicial hearings ALJ-V's conduct
often involve rulemaking, as well as
rates, citations, complaints, certificates, financial agreements and
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securities issuances and that
rulemaking is policy making. However, the Public Utilities Act only
gives the ALJ-Vs the power to issue
"recommended" or "tentative" decisions, even in rulemaking. The final
agency decision is subject to the
direction and supervision of a "chief
hearing officer" who oversees the
ALJ-V's. The Board concluded that
under the traditional test, the ALJV's are not managerial employees.
In other cases involving public
sector attorneys, the Illinois courts
have applyed an alternative test
finding that particular attorneys
were managers as a matter of law.
Under the alternative test one
must consider whether the attorneys are, in essence, surrogates for
an office holder.
Looking to the Public Utilities
Act, the State Panel held that the
ALJ-V's were not managerial employees. The section of the Act that
the ICC pointed to says hearing
examiners are to be "capable of
independently evaluating the evidentiary record and drafting a
proposed final order." The Board
reasoned that this provision merely
sets out qualifications for hearing
examiners and does not authorize
them to act in the same manner as
other managerial public attorneys.
Union Discrimination
In Otis v. Chicago Joint Board,
Local 200, Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union, Case No.
L-CB-06-035 (ILRB Local Panel,
2010), the Local Panel accepted the
ALJ's findings that the Chicago
Joint Board, Local 200, Retail,
Wholesale, Department Store Union
violated section 10(b)(1) of the
IPLRA when the union president
distributed the proceeds from a
grievance award in a discriminatory
fashion but the Panel denied the
petitioner's request for sanctions
against the union.
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The ALJ determined that the
union president excluded the charging parties from receiving the
proceeds from a grievance award in
retaliation for their support of an
alternative candidate for union
president; for voting down a
tentative agreement that the president had negotiated; and for
complaints they lodged with administrators regarding the union president. The Panel upheld the ALJ's
factual findings because they were
not contradictory to the manifest
weight of the evidence.
The Panel also upheld the ALJ's
denial of sanctions against the
union. The charging parties sought
sanctions against the union pursuant to Section 11(c) of the IPLRA,
which, allows sanctions at the
Boards discretion if the party has
made denials without reasonable
cause and found to be untrue; or 2)
has engaged in frivolous litigation
for the purpose of delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
The Local Panel noted that the test
for determining whether a party
has made factual assertions that
were untrue and made without
reasonable cause is an objective one
of reasonableness under the circumstances. According to Board
precedent, whether the party has
engaged in frivolous litigation must
be determined based on whether its
defenses to the charges were made
in good faith, or represented a
"debatable" position. In applying
this test, the Panel determined that
the union's denials were not clearly
made without reasonable cause,
and its arguments in fact represented a debatable position. The
Board noted that the union's
meritless claim was distinguishable
from a claim that is "so implausible
as to be categorized as unreasonable."
Accordingly, the Panel ordered
the union to cease and desist from
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violating the employees' rights
under the IPLRA and grant them
the distribution of the overtime
grievance award plus interest.

Fourth Amendment
Developments
Auditing Text Messages
In City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon , 130
S.Ct. 2619 the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the audit of a
police officer's text messages on a
city issued alpha numeric pager was
reasonable and did not violate the
officer's Fourth Amendment rights.
The City issued police officers
alphanumeric pagers to help mobilize the officers in an emergency.
Each pager was allotted a limited
number of characters sent or
received each month. Usage in
excess of the allotted characters
resulted in additional fees. Before
issuing the pagers the city implemented and a "Computer Usage,
Internet and E-mail Policy" to all
city employees. The policy specified that the city "reserves the right
to monitor all network activity
including e-mail, with or without
notice. Users should have no
expectation of privacy." While the
policy did not specifically apply to
text messages, the city notified the
employees that text messages were
treated as e-mails and would be
subject to auditing.
Quon and other officers exceeded
the character allotment on their
pagers for several months, causing
their supervisor to investigate
whether the officers were exceeding their limit for work related
messages or for personal messages
to determine if the existing character limit was sufficient. At the city's
request, the service provider gave
the city the transcripts of Quon's
and other officers' text messages.
This audit revealed that many of
the officer's text messages were not
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work related. The investigating
officer redacted messages that
were sent while Quon was off-duty,
but the transcript showed that
many of Quon's remaining messages were unrelated to police
business. Quon was disciplined for
violating Ontario Police Department (OPD) rules. Quon and other
officers with whom he had exchanged texts messages filed suit,
alleging, among other claims, that
the city violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by obtaining and
reviewing the transcript of Quon's
text messages.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and
security of persons against certain
arbitrary and invasive acts by
officers of the Government, and
applies when the Government acts
as an employer.
In O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987) the plurality created a
two-prong test for determining if a
government employee's Fourth
Amendment rights have been
violated. The plurality held that
whether the employee has an
expectation of privacy and his
constitutional rights are implicated, depends on the "operational
realities" of the workplace, and
must be determined on a case-bycase basis. If it is determined that
the employee has a legitimate
privacy expectation, the employer's
intrusion upon that privacy must be
reasonable, whether it is for noninvestigatory work-related purposes or for investigations of work
related-misconduct. Justice Scalia
concurred. Applying the protection
of the Fourth Amendment generally to government employees, he
would have held that government
searches related to materials or to
investigate violations of workplace
rules which are regarded as
reasonable and normal in the
private-employer context do not
violate the Amendment.
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Because O'Connor involved the
privacy of a government employee's
office, and not the use of a
technological device, the Court
declined to apply the "operational
realities" prong, because of the
unpredictability of how workplace
norms will evolve given the advances in technology and societal
norms regarding employer-provided communication devices. Instead, the Court assumed arguendo
that Quon had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his text messages
and the city's review of the
messages constituted a Fourth
Amendment search. The Court
then applied the second prong of
the O'Connor opinion and held that
because the City's review of the
messages was motivated by a
legitimate work related purpose
and was not excessive in scope, it
was reasonable under the plurality
approach.
The search was justified because
the city audited Quon's text
messages to determine whether the
character limit was sufficient, and
the intrusion was not excessive
because it was "an efficient and
expedient way" to determine if the
character limit was sufficient. The
Court noted that the search was not
overly intrusive because even if
Quon could assume some level of
privacy in his text messages, it
would not have been reasonable for
Quon to assume that his messages
were exempt under all circumstances from an audit, because he
was notified to the contrary.
Similarly, because the city had a
legitimate reason for the search
and it would have been regarded as
reasonable in the private-employer
contexted, the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment
under Justice Scalia's approach.
The Court explained that the
implications of the use of employerprovided electronic devices are not
yet clear, but provided insight on
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what it might consider in determining
the privacy issue in the future. The
Court speculated that the privacy
expectation might be strengthened
because some people may consider the
use of cell phones and pagers to "be
essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even selfidentification." The Court, conversely,
speculated that the privacy expectation might be weakened because these
instruments may be so vital to self-
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expression and have become relatively
inexpensive, employees may not need
to rely on an employer-provided
communication device and may be
able to provide their own.
‚
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